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Historians have recently been expressing- concern about the political 
uses of the past. Examples of this are the conferences and seminars and the 
monographic issues of jom11als devoted to the subject1• However, there is 
considerable variation in what is understood by "political usÉnú=and that 
variation is concomitant with what each author considers an unacceptable 
or mísleading use of the past. Here I am going to refer to a particular polit-
ical use of the past which is immediately related with the construction -
sorne say DúêÉcovÉêó?I=others "imagining" - of traditions. The use that con-
sists in stating that we cannot judge other times from our own time, that the 
values and beliefs of each age are so different and discontinuous from ours 
that the historian must make a moral epoché and devote himself to under-
standing and not making value judgements of the object of bis study. Re-
cently, this point of view has ·often appeared in connectiou with the politics 
of nationalisation of populations. Far even in nationalist conceptualisations 
which understand themselves as civic or not ethnicist, those in which em-
phasis is placed on the political will of the cítizens - or, as Renan puts it, 
those which understand the nation as a "daily plebiscite" - resort to the 
legacy of tradition when it comes to delimiting the body of civility which 
seeks to constitute or legitimise itself as a nation. 
Renan's theory - often cited asan example of political or subjective na-
tionalism as opposed to the kind of objective or culrural nationalism that 
l. Sorne examples are the seminars Identita mediterranea: gli usi del passato politici, at 
the Instituto [taliano per gli Studi Filosofici, Naplcs, January 1999, and the Cursos d'Arrábi-
da, Usages politiques de l'Histoire, coordinated by Jacques Revell September 2000. En-
quete, the joumal of the École d'Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, devotes a monograph-
ic issue in the third trimester of 2000 to Les usages politiques du passé; also Pasajes de pen-
samiento contemporáneo called its dossier in no. 1 in 1999 Los usos poltticos del pasado, 
and· Pedro Ruiz, in "La historia en nuestro paradójico presente", in n. 9, December 2002, of 
the same joumal, gives an account of numerous publications on thls subject. 
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goes back to llerder - seems to be a privileged example in this aspect-_F.' 
althot,Jgh it is true that Renan does not cease to insist on the universalistd'. 
tological and axiological principJe that "man is a reasonablc moêal ú=ber'. 
befare being enc1osed in one language or another, before being a memb"' 
of one race or another, an adherent or one culture or another"2, that <loes lf'-' 
prevent his defin!tion of nadan from expressing a tension, or even an amúDl¡=
bívaleñce, between the 'two criteria of ándáváduaúáon=that he establishes .. ·Allf 
Todorov indicated, on the one hand the criterion of the willingness to live fályú=
common points to the freedom of the individual, but the criterion of culíüíúeyú=
al legacy points to externa! detennination of the individual, not to freedofif;;¡f\ 
but to necessity3. This tension between the two criteria is clearly éÉêcÉéíáblúáyú=
towards the end of his famous lecture: · .. : .. yú=
.. · t 
A nation is a soul, a spiritual principie. There are two things which constitute that soul,:-; 
that spiritual principle, and whích to tell the truth are only one. The first is in the past, .: 
the second in the present. One is the common possession of a rich legacy of memories; "' 
the other is the present consent, the desire to live together, the willingness to maáníaáêáúWKú=
the undivided inheritance that has been received. Man is ·not externporised, gÉnílÉmÉInúIKyWK=
The nation, like the individual, is the result of a long past of efforts, sacrifices andi( 
anxieties. The worship of our forefathcrs is the most legitimate of all forms of woêshléX?úK=
our forefathers made us what we are. A beroic past, great men and glory (true glory. of '· 
conrse) - these are the social capital on which the idea of a nation is founded4. · '' .· 
.. ; W·ú=
. - -. 
So that, although Renan emphasises the aspect of the free will of indi-
viduals and seeks. ·to detach the nation from externa! determinations, . 
whether racial, ethnic or even linguistic, he ends up by thinking of an indi.,. . 
vidual to whom it is hard to impute free decisions, since the "non-extempo- . 
rised men" who constitute the unüy of the nation are what their ancestors . 
have made of them. Thus, even in tbis subjective, poHtical conception of 
nationalism, the legacy of culture is reintroduced as the iodividuation crite-
rion of nations; although, to be fair, in a subordinate way. Nevertheless, Re-
nan :reveals catain aspects that are pertinent for our present purposes. For, 
not wühout aênbávalÉncÉú=as jf caught on the hmns of a dilemma, for tlris 
defender of f'reedom and consent "forgetting and even hístorical mistak.es 
are an essentiaJ factor in the creation of a nation, so that the progress of his-
torical studies often becomes a danger for nationality''. The reason is that 
"unity is always brought about brutaJly", and that the fundamental thing in 
a nation consists in the fact that "the individuals have a great deal in com-
mon, and also that they have all forgotten man y thfngs" 5• It ís true that Re-
nan was writing only a few years after the Franco-Prussian War, when de-
feated France had lost Alsace and Lorraine to the Reich. And the context of. 
2. Emest Renan, ¿Qué es una nación?, Sequítur, Madrid, 2001, p. 73. ·. · .. 
3. T. Todorov, Nous et les at1tres, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1989. " , .. 
4. Renan, op. cit., pp. 85-86. . ·, , 
5. Renan, op. cit., pp. 35 and 39. The emphasis is mine. . ., .. , 
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decades. If we apply Wittgenstein's methodo1ogical "look and see" to síuEÍ_UJLNlNú=
ies such as Pagden's The Fall of Natural Man, Todorov's The ConèuÉsí JSzQú=
America, Ginzburg's The Cheese and the Worms, Detienne's 111e Daily Li[_¿Jtl 
of the Greek Gods, Veyne)s Did the _ Greeks Relieve in tlieir jóíhs?úBWXú=
Geertz's The Theatre State in Nineteenth.-Century Bali or Le Roy iaduêáéfa!lú=
Mon.taillou: Cathars and Catlwlics in. a Frenclt Village, to take very dávÉááúvá=
examples, are they historical studies or anthropologicaJ studie8? aÉéÉndáñgLWDKú=
on the acadeniic and supra-university milieus of the various 1inguistic areas/ ':;*-i 
the list of cases coulcl be endless. The fact is that as we move away from íhúúú=
paradigmatic cases of each discipline the question becomes hard to answÉ}gIál}?ú=
whereas with those cases it is easy to resolve. However, what is new is íhúCú=
increasing nun1ber of studies of HblmTed genre". Even with regard to fáÉlcEàWxú=
work as the distinctive note of anthropology, the matter becom.es complicatq}ffü 
ed if one tak:es into account what has become known as "history of the coli;.,:_i;] 
temporary world" or "history of the present time", in which archive work áúfáúXWú=
combined with testimonies, interviews with survivors or inf01mers6, and);: 
documents - shared by historians and anthropologists - in which the áí{úJJúp=
scriptíon is not in writing but in pictures or in still or moving photograpruq=:·_;:f 
images. Oue may well ask, once again, whether the chapters of Pete(==); 
Burke,s recent book concerníng the use of pictures as historical ÉvádÉné·úrú=
about material culture, stereotypes of others. or children and wo111en in daily:§ 
life are history or anthropology7• .- . ":'./::', 
· Por oúr preserit purposes, therefore, the differences between aníhêoéofoú DFW=
gy and hlstory can be left somewhat to one side, for the fact is that thef -< 
botb seek to Study what is other, different or alien; altbough, for OUI' present: :: 
purpose-s once again, there is a difference-: which has been treated at soênÉ KZ·úúW=
length :___in what has been the effective experience of the two disciplines. As -
has been pointed out by Marcel Detienne - but Detienne is a professor of _:_· 
social and cultural history, mythology and anlhropology of Greek civiHsa.:. ) 
tion at 1 ohns Hopkins úniversity - "when an anthropologíst uteets a histo- -
r:ian, as he greets hlln he m nst be aware that history - I am speaking of the ,:· 
science-was bó1n national, whereas anthropology was always comparative :·: 
by nature"8. I will c0111e back to this aspect later1 in thé third part of thi.5 ·-' 
talk, as those who defend a moral epoché in the understanding of what is 
alien tend to look for support in the affirmation that one can only compare -
the coméaêablÉú=and that one cannot judge what is not comparable witb our.: -
sel ves. So that what both kinds of knowledge are aboot is the privilege and . 
uniqueness that we grant to the particular, how we think about it in relation 
. ;- . . 
6. See /A. Mémoire, l'Histoire, l'Oubli. Seuil, Paris, 2000, p. 437, and Geertz, C. AJvaálú=
a ble Light. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000, ch. V, especially pp. 118 ff. ·. 
7. P. Burke, Eyewitnessing. The Uses vf Images as Historícal Evidence, Reektiori 
Books, London, 200 L - · ' 
8. M. Detienne, Compara.r lo incomparable, Península, Barcelona, 2001, pp. 29-30. · 
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to ourselves, a thinking and relation that, depending on Wnethe 
one kind or another, will substantially alter what we un'deJ:statt . 
sel ves", which is what should interest us. For the problem is not so mri 
the mere fact that thc past is at the service of the present as the purpose ·-- .. . $:;, 
which it is. In short, if the so-called human and social sciences must bd.ó:f'.-"', 
interest to us it is not because of smne desire for erudition devoid of life, or · 
eveo contrary to life, or as techniques for social organisation and control, 
but for the possibility they may offer of other ways of imagirúng ourselves 
with a view to a better Jife. lt is with regard to this ax iological option con-
cerning history or anthropology that I say that the use of the past which 
consists in emphasisíng the "'unrepeatable and incomparable individuality 
of histmical sítuations" entails the moral and poJitical risk of finding cme-
self "defenceless against the inertia of what is established, becoming an ad-
vocate of what exists because it has been historically trammutted,, [and] 
"the famous understanding easily turns into justifying everything", as J.J. 
Carreras says with regard to the German historicism of Ranke and Mei-
necke and as can be said of any particularism that only achnits immanent 
analyses9• 
lndeed, those who argue for abstaining from judge1nent of value do so 
witb the implicit assumption that ali historical individuals - whatever their 
concretion, whether they be people, actions, practices or co1lective bodíes -
have the same value, because, as comparison is neither possible nor desir-
able, value can only be decjded on the basis of eriteda and n1odel1' tlrnt are 
interna] to what is valued. However, someone who affinns equality of value 
for all cases affinns, ea ipso, that nothing has value, for the very notion of 
value is nullified, as it has thc sense of indicating tlle set or system of our 
preferences: something has value for us because we prefer it to somethlng 
that <loes uot have value far us. And this is not an empirica1 question but a 
conceptual one, since it has to do with how we use our .language. The fact is 
that from the abolition of the notiou of value one can derive sorne unex-
pectedly pernicious consequcnces insofar as memory and the use of mem-
ory are concemed. I believe that Todorov, in a context. of constant, somewhat 
simplistic invocations of memory tout court, has the merit of having em-
phasised an aspect which is no less important for being simple: the fact that 
memory and forgetting are not the terms of a simple opposition, since for-
getting is a constitutive parl of the exercise of memory10• Only the fraudu-
lent device of an omniscient divine intellect could lead us to imagine com-
plete, transparent access to past, present and [uture. lnsofar as we are deal-
ing here with human inteJligences, what is oééosÉdú=stricdy speaking, is not 
memory and forgetting, but suppression (forgetting) and conservation, as 
9. J.J. Can-eras, Razón de Historia. Marcial Pons, Saragossa, 2000, p. 58. 
10. T. Todorov, Les e1bus de la memoire, Arléa, Pa.ris, 1995. See further in Memoria del 
mal, le11tació11 del bien. Península, Barcelona, 2002. 
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memory is the result of the relation of the two aspects. Consequently/ $ 
lecting what we wish to conserve from the wealth of our past is consíáêuíáúúlNDú=
of memory. This shows the need to invol ve our preferences, which ífáúílfü=
scholar, if he is not a solipsist bordering on autism, will think of, if noíKáúJúáfál=
universal, then at least as capable of being gerteralisable. All the more, WméfBíúDWyN=
haps, if one reckons that selective recovery of the past is tensed by the stib_*i)_':-¡ 
sequent use that we may wish to make of ,it. So that those who argue for alFúàXIú=
stention from judgement, those who consciously or unconsciously aêÉ XsááNfjú=
guided by the ideal of a distant objectivity of the natural sciences, in êuláhgúú¡=
out an judgement of value, in excluding any possibility of selection, converH ; 
historical study into a mere indistinct accumulation which .weighs dowfii ; 
and impedes the project dimension - imagining preferable ways of life -.;. Óf;:; 
the exercise of historical memory. --._._\.-+{ , 
Moreover, overdoing this viewpoint - abstaining from making valllec. 
judgements for the sake of nót distmting what is considered to be incompah•_ « 
able and irreducibly different - leads the person who maintains it eithettd@ 
silence orto dialogic inconsistency, if he <loes in fact go on talking abou( 
anything. For either what he talks about has something to do with us, Ótf 
else it hasn't. Ifit has something to do with us, if it concems our lives, therii 
comparison and judgement are unavoidable. On the other hand, if íhÉêÉWáúL=
no sense that can be common to others and oursel ves, then it is best to beii 
silent because discourse is abolished. Note that I · said "sense" and noti 
"agreement", because it is only possible to agree or disagree about sonáúXI á=
thing that we understand. The fact is that anthropology, a discipline witl:() 
even more moments of identity crisis than history, has already faced this\ 
disjunctive: either to accept that there is sorne sense common to others and Y 
ourselves or to _he silent. It was after the classical period of the discipline--': 
the time_ of the incipient period of decolonisation - that this issue wa&/ 
raised, once anthropology had been defined as a "sociology of primitive 
peoples" (Lucy Mair). If it could serve for those of us who were not ?éêámúI=
itive _peoples" to understand ourselves, then anthropology was something -
more than sociological knowledge referring exclusively to others. But if 
sucli a use was not possible, then another no less urgent question arase: _--
why practise it? As a private solace for adventurous hearts, or for a bettel' 
understanding of others with a view to a more efficient administration of 
them politically and ecqnomically? Obviously, this latter possibility. was ex--·-· 
cluded by the anti-colonialist movements themselves. Michel Leiris, an · 
atypical ethnologist, has the merit of having been one of the first to grasp --
the situation clearly11 . · · · _ - _ _ · - _ _.: _ 
It is -true that we éannot-now dO -away with the -strcmgly ethnocent:ric -
loading of a definition of anthropology that was based on the poorlyformed . 
lL See M. Leiris, "L'ethnographe devantle colonialisme", in Cinq études d'ethnologie. 
Gallimard, 1997. 
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pline to its academic status, at least in bngláshWKWséÉakµlgáúúè=. 
well known that in the fifties this conceptual distiilctioribégáfi'f . Y . . 
úf¡úúXúúáúúúúúúúúêWúWúZáúíó=;:: úú!NúúúúWéúcúúWêNWgú!f=xúisáê·W•nwDáág=
tive - and to get away from its dangerous moral and political effects. FÓr . ii 
the distinction between civilised and prirnitive was converting all thaf Was < 
different into a kind of bastard or aborted emergence of the civilised, that is, 
of the anthropologist's cultural frame of reference (far instance, remember 
the categorisation made by Frazer - and the whole British intellectualist íêaú=
. . 
dition, as Evans-Pritchard called it - of magic as bastard physics or false 
science). Along the same lines, in the case of history it was· the impulse to 
get away from the contemplation of the past "as a collection of injnstices, 
superstitions and errors" that led German histmicism to criticise the snppo-
sition of "a hnman ·nature fitted into a theory of progress, which made it 
neces'sary to jndge each era not in relation ·to itself but on the basis of what 
it contribnted to general standardising progress"12. 1 believe that J.J. Car-
reras's affirmation about Meinecke's historicism can be repeated, word for 
word, with regard to the partieularism of Boas and Ruth Benedict 'when 
they confronted cultural evolutionism for similar reasons. And it was in this 
way that the emic perspective appeared, long befare Pike technically estab-
lished the emic/etic distinction. · 
Nevertheless, opposing oneself to the undesirable effects of evolution-
ism and its central category ofprogress - as the historicists wished to do in 
history and the particlilarists in anthropology - need not necessarily lead us 
from ari undesirable viewpoint to a worse one. That is to say, getting away 
from precisely what the historicists and the particularists sought to avoid 
<loes not inevitably lead one· to postulate incomparability, or abstention 
from judgement of value, or a renunciation of criticism and therefore an un-
derstanding which ultimately amounts to justifying everything. And not for 
the reasons offered so far, but because of the very logic of understanding 
what ·is aláÉnú=For that pretension of understanding "from nowhere", of 
wouid-be . objectivity, ·as if it were possible to understand human actions 
without involving the pre.:.understanding and understanding of my own cul-
tural 'asSuIÍlptions, ·is fu various aspects indebted to a conception that seeks 
to make' the study of human phenomena analógous to that of natural phe'.... 
riomená, as the sciences of 'naturé were conceived befare the criticism of 
the positivist conception of them. 1 shall continue with my argumentation in 
three parts: · firstly, 1 shall criticise the sharp dichotomy between facts 'and 
values; 8econdly, 1 shall expound how coinparability, insofar as it is neces'" 
sary for understanding, implies judgement of value; finally, I shall criticise 
12. Carreras, op. cit., p. 41. 
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a non-explicit supposition of the supporters of incomparability and val- ·· 
orative epoché, namely their conception of cultures or epochs as uniform 
units, as "drops of pure cultural blood" or "semantic crystals", to boJTow 
exprcssions used by Geertz concenling what he calls the integral configura-
tionaJ conception of cnltural identity. -, -
*** ·Wúí=
Those in favour of abstaining from any value judgement in cultural oú=
hísloricnl intetprctations explicitly or implicitly suppose that one can estab-
lish a sharp distincti on separating two_ kinds of discourse between which ¡:: 
there can be no possible b1idges or transitions: factual or ckscriptive dáúIúXWDoíXy=
course and valorative discourse. Intlinging this exclusive distinction would.<; 
imply either committing a moralistic fallacy (basing a prediction about a fu- ". 
ture state of things on a moral judgcment about the present situation) or else Júú=
a naturnlistic fallacy (consisting in proceeding from a factual premise to ' a' 
moral judgement)°13• An example proposed by Ulises Moulincs a few óÉaêú=
ago, slightly modified, may show how the affirmation of these two fallacies 
is, in tun1, a met.a-fallacy. Consider thís conversation between two people:_ .. .l: _ 
A. Did you know that Gómez Olivas has strangled one of his colleagues? 
B. What? Has he gone mad? , '''1 
A. No, although that's what he's trying to make the university and the poHce believe.":r} 
B. So díd he act unthinkingly, overcome by confusion? . · .... 
A. No, everything intlicates that he had it carefully planned. Ever since they started a _ 
pubHc controversy, Gómez Olivas had been suggcsting that his colleague was raving, WKú=
that he couldnst cope with his sense of guilt, that he had had suiddal tendencies ÉvKúúJWKFN=
since be was a chllcl, anti that he was in fact going to do away with himself by síêaúkaWú=
g1ing himself. And G6roez Olivas thought that he would get away with it because hÉDúX[KWWúl=
a man with considerable ínfluence in certain academic and political quarters. · 1 úD·= ú=
B. I3ut what motive did he have? -
A. He wanted to be victorious in the dispute, and he wanted his opponent to appear un- ·"-.:; 
balauced and not worthy of belief. 
B. That Gómez OHvas is a scoundrel anda cowan.I! .. . , 
... 
Well, if we consider this dialogue we · see that .ali A's · úffáúaíáons=aêú=-· 
"matters of fact'', in which physical, psychological or sociological attribut-: ú=
es of Gómez Olivas are predicated, except far the conclusion, in which B fi-'..; 
nally makes a moral valuatio11 of the strangling professor. According . WJ';: 
those who defend the sharp dichotomy between facts and values, this wouldFú=
seem to be a clear case of naturalistic fallacy, becanse a value judgemé.nt fa Jú?=
inferred from factual premises. Yct this argumcntative conversatíon is éÉêWJIú=
fectly reasonable, so reasonable that inany of the moral intcrpretations áêEú=
our lives are of a similar kind. Even legal interpretations, incidentally, í#kFú=
.... , . . . . .. . . . - , ú=_, .: KDX·WêWúWááú=
13. U. Moulines, "Hechos y valores: falacias y metafalacias. Un ejercicio integra<J 
cion.ista". lsegor(a, n. 3, 1991, pp. 26-43. . ú=
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whicb cruelty, bad faith and so on are sometimes established on the bnsis of · 
questioos of fact which are considered proveo - someone took advantage of 
the darkness of the night, and so on. The example of the strangling profes-
sor shows that maintaining a strict dichotomy between descriptivc language 
and valorative languagc is fallacious. Whetbcr iu the scicnces of nature or 
in the humanities, inasmucb as we a1:e dealing with interpretations, our his-
torically constructed language of reference, with its implicit and explicit 
valuations, is the only one with which we can give an account of our ex pe-. 
riences (although, on this point, there are sorne differences between ordi-
nary language and theoretical Ianguages on which 1 shall not dwell now). 
lt is true that the rclation existJng between factual premises and deci-
sions is not identical to the relation between facts and theory which occurs 
in natural sciences, but this should not prevent us from accepting that there 
are many kinds of rclation between factual premises and conclusions. 
Rather than an exclusive dualisrn, what we have is a great variety of differ-
ent kinds of factual statements and different kinds of decisions (think of the 
argumentations of politics, of art and its criticism, of economics, and so 
on). The facts are certainly given, yet this is not equivalenL to saying that 
whal causes a fact to be considered as such is also immediately given, but 
rather it emerges from tbe various ways in which people live (whether con-
sidercd from a transcultural or a historical viewpoint). Which does not 
mean that we have to discard absolutely the distinction betwccn facts and 
values, between descriptive or factual language and valorative language. In 
general, this distinction has to be understand as one of degree and not of 
lúnd, where there is room for vety differenl densities of each of the two 
things in each discourse. Only a circumstantial analysis can indicale to us 
wheo we are really comnlitting a fallacy, an improper transition between 
what "is" and what "should be". 
In any case, en passant we bave shown something that agrees with what 
was pointed out by Ricoenr in his recent book, La Mémoire, l'Histoire, 
l'Oubli: that, given the character of our statements, interpretation and its 
suppositions move on the three levels of historical discourse, tlle <locumen-
tary level, the level of explanation and understanding, and the level of liter-
ary representation of lhc past14• The same could be said of anthropology. 
And so I shall move on to the second stage in my argwnentation: how com-
parison, inasmuch as it is necessary for interpretative understanding, im-
plics judgement of value, something that is present on the three levels of 
historie al discours.e. · . . , , , ; 
*** 
lndeed, after the controversial interpretations to which The Structure of 
Scienti.fic Revolutions gavc rise, Kuhn warned lhat incommensurability did 
. · . .... , ... 
14. Ricoeur, op. cit.f p. 235. • • • • t : t ú= ' • •• ' • 
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not mean incomparability15• On the contrary, in order to dete1mine the <l '/ '::m; 
gree of inconunensurability of two theories, or two languages, the fir';·, 
thing to do is to compare · them. So that one can say that comparison alf: 
contrast is an unavoidable stage in understanding. If tlús is so, this coméaú¿=
ison and contrast of what is alien can only be carried out in my own lánú=DJúú=
guage of reference. What other possibility is there? In other words, it is imsL, . 
possible to proceed to such a comparison except from the theoretical éêÉú ·K·_¿=
understanding and understanding that we have of ourselves. So that we íÉnIúWWXDWúDK=
tatively situate an action or a practice or a set of the.m as corresponding 'td::;'.liJ 
or opposed to some aspect of those actions or practices that mak:e up: SMEWúDKWD=
life. Certainly, what bothers us in evolutionistconceptions is the fact íhaíK·íímú=
their case such behaviour unfailingly concluded in a judge1nent that undÉêúúLà=
stood what was alien as something defective with regard to what was prop::..:: .. :· 
er to ourselves. This was the case with Frazer - aud the neo-Frazerians of ú=
the sixties and seventies, such as Jarvie - in considering magic to be false ..... · 
science or rn:istaken physics. Nevertheless, the impo'rtant thing for our disl .\' .. ú=
cussion is that there is something that still links us with Frazer, since wt¡·y:,'.,': 
share with him a certain sense of reality and certain very general éêáncáélÉpKúEDKWú=
which characterise what is considered a good argumc.nt or an acceptable iti;.:';@ 
ference. For example, although we no longer interpret raimnaking rituals ás,;_ .':.: 
false physics but rather as an emotional expression or as the representation . · 
of the satisfaction that takes the place of the desire that it should rain, nev"" ·; 
ertheless we continue sharing with Frazer the idea that it is true that the rit- • 
uals do not bring rain. Taylor is rigbt when he says that "we cannot say tha( / 
understanding them [others] witbout distortion means sbowing them as not':J) 
being mistaken in sorne important aspect"16.. . " , , >)'·) 
But let's turn to a closer example belonging to the construction of tradl..: :; 
tions, which tends to be a breeding-ground for ·affirmations of incompara..;: 
bility and, therefore, abstention frorn judgements of value. · Is.hall now take 
the case of a commemorative use of the past: the year of the Borgias, cele-
brated during the acadernic year 2000-2001 in Valencia, and also the yeat 
of the fifth centenary of the promul.gation of the papal bull that founded the . 
University of Valencia (Universitat de Valencia-Estud.i General),- the univer.:: .·.' 
sity I belong to. In that context, an ironic artiele in the press whieh recalled ,· 
the responsibility of Rodrigo Borgia, Pope Alexander VI, in the justification ·: 
of the conquest of America; the giving of it to the Kingdom of Castile and 
its evangelisation __:_ with the consequences whi_ch all that biought about. -
sparked off a virulent controversy. Todorov, distinguish.ing between wit-
ness, historian and commemoratoi-, says that the first two subrnit their acú=
• 1 
1 ¡ ' • - : . ú= 1 '. ' ' • 1 • • ' •• 1 \ . 1 ' • 1 
15. T. Kuhn, ¿Qué son las revoluciones cientfjicas? y otros enwzyos, Paidós, Barcelona. 
See "Conmensurabilidad, comparabilidad y comunicabilidad", pp. 95 ff. 
16. Ch. Taylor, Argumentos filosóf1cos, Paidós, Barcelona, 1997, p. 209 . . 
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counts to the evidence of truth, whereas this does not happen in the case 
the third; he also says that history makes complex and that commemoration ·_ 
simplifies, "as its commonest aim is to provide us with idols to venerate and 
enemies to abhor"; that history is sacrilegious and commemoration sacraJis;_ 
es 17. The interesting thing in this case is that the types of the commemora-
tor and the historian were synthesised in vadous people moved by the same 
interest: acclairning the glory of "one of the more illustrious and powerful 
Valencian families in history ... ". It is significant that, among all the out-
bursts in the controversy, that restitution of historicism was recurrent, with 
an insistence; as a collateral argument or a last resort, on the idea that the 
historian should limit himself to "understanding and not judging" Alexan-
der VI, because he "was a character in history and not a politician to be 
asked for explanations", that the Borgias were "people who behaved in ac-
cordance with what the times demanded ... ", and so on. 
So let's take the Borgia Pope and his first American papal bull as a case 
to illustrate the affinnation that comparison and value judgements are in-
separable from the logic, or from the effective conduct, of understanding it-
self. In his papal bull Jnter Caetera18, Alexander VI gave the Indies Hin per-
petuity" to Isabel and Fernando, con:finning them as úDownÉês=of íhÉú=with 
full, free and absolute power, authority and jurisdiction". In the document 
we can read that of ali works the most preferable is the "exaltation" of the 
Catholic faith so as to bring about "the downfall of the nations of barbar-
ians and the subduing of them to our faith" .. And, according to Alexander 
VI, there was nobody more deserving than the King and Queen of Castile 
and Aragón, "as can be understood from the reconquest of the Kingdom of 
Granada from the tyrannical power of the Moors". Thus the text establishes 
a connection between bringing about the downfall of nations of.barbarians, 
subduing them to the Catholic faith, deeming the Moors to be barbarians, 
and considering that their political regime was "tyrannical". For the ·agent, 
the Borgia Pope, this connection was what mainly justified the gift. 
Now it is true that in arder to understand the matter it is necessary to re-
fer to many premises which are not explicit but form part of the under-
standing that the Roman Catholic· church has of itself as expressed in its 
language. And so, in the interpretation of the text, one must certainly bring 
in the fact that the Moors were a problematic case, for according to tbe 
dominant conceptual schema it was hard to consider them as barbarians, 
since the category of "barbarian" was understood positively (as a good savR 
age) or negatively (as a bad savage), but in any case as equivalent to an un-
tivilised savage. The problem in the categorisation of the Moors carne from 
· 17. T. Todorov. Memoria del mal, tellfación del bien, op. cit., p; 159. 
18. I am using the version of the bull wNch is reproduced in the documentary annex in 
Bestard, J. and Contreras; J. Bárbaros, paganos; salvajes y primitivos. Barcanova, 
Barcelona, pp. 361-362. 
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the fact that, on the basis of the most visible empiric evidence - their scáÉnlú=
tific knowledge and their techniques, as shown in the material achievements.i 
of their societies - it could not be simply stated that they were savages iri \ 
the strict sense of the word. And here the addition of the "tyrannical power'Mii 
characteristic of the Moors comes to help us in our interpretation, ahcl } 
Rodrigo in his justification. Why? Well, because according to the books of/ 
Aristotle's Politics - in which the theory of natural servitude is establishedi 
- the slave is barbarie by nature, and the criteria for detennining barbarity\\ 
are either the absolute inability to live in a political regime - hence the reitL ii 
erated quoting, at that time, of the !liad: a barbarian is someone who livesi/ 
"without society, without law, without family" - or else the absence of a ra.:\/ 
tional political regime, that is, living urider a tyrannical regime. Howeve1\ iii 
Aristotle's assertion is reinterpreted by St Augustine in his De Civitate Dei. i 
as meaning that "where there is no true justice, however much justice there i 
may be or appear to be, as in those who lack the Christian faith, there is no 
law or justice, and very little that could be called a true republic"19• Ergó,<i 
someone who does not live under the prescriptions of true religion lives unúWK=
der a tyrannical regime, therefore he is a barbarian, and therefore the Moors > 
are barbarians although not strictly savages. . . 
What it is interesting to emphasise is the conduct followed in the inter--
pretation of an action and its justification in order to understand - in the 
sense of "grasp" - its peculiarity. lt is true that 1 have had to bring in ÉlÉú=
ments that belong to the language of the agent, or his self-understanding, or.'··• 
his world view or whatever one likes to call it. By_ proceeding in this way l 
have obtained greater clarity about his motives and reasons. But this is not 
at ali the same as saying that I abstain from judging, since Aristotle's cêáíÉúY=
ria for classifying humarrity and the theory of natural servitude and St Auú·=· 
gustine's conceptions about the true political regime seem to me to be false 
or incorrect and undesirable, something to which I cannot commit myself · 
and about which 1 cannot feel indifferent. However, those implicit aspects ·. 
which l do not share are precisely the ones that at first made the Borgia . 
Pope's reasons obscure and opaque forme, and the ones which consequent'-'. 
ly sparked off the interpretative process that seeks clarification of what, ab 
initio, is only partially intelligible or unintelligible. And so, like the case of 
the rainmaking rituals, the immediate thing is the comparison and contrast 
of an action, institution or practice or set of them, alíen and at first not 
19. 1 have taken the quotation from Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas. Apologética Historia 
Sumaria. Obras Completas, ed. Ángel Losada. Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1988, vol. 8, p. 
1584. In "Soberbia, racionalidad y sujeto en el discurso antropológico clásico'', in M. Cruz 
(ed.), Tiempo de subjetividad, Paidós, Barcelona, 1996, 1 have shown how this conceptual 
assumption - namely, the irrationality or, as appropriate, defective rationality of those who 
do not live under the cultural and political regime of the "true religion" - is shared even by 
those who seem most distant from this asswnption (Las Casas himself). 
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clearly understandable, with actions, institutions or practices that cüêêÉsú=
pond to my way of life (in this case, a lay democratic conception of politics 
and an affirmation of the equal dignity of all men). But at the same time as 
the establishment of the comparative contrast there is a valuation of what is 
alien. And no objection to what 1 have said is entailed in agreeing wíth the 
affümation that the possible moral decisíons depend on the morality in 
which the problem mises, as not every moral problem is brought about in 
any given moralíty. For to accept that the moral problems and the decisions 
which might be taken by subjects depend on their various moral contexts 
does not mean that we abstain from indicating the moral emptiness, or 
sometimes abyss, that this entails. 
Cases of genocide and war may be privileged examples: there are many 
testimonies, provided by the agents and by the victims, which affirm that 
the most grave horrors and cruelties are possible owing to the non-consider-
ation of the humanity of those massacred. Joanna Bourke20 has recently em-
phasised the racial component in the war of extermination in the USSR, 
practised against the J ews and the "Slav races" not only by the Einsatzgrup-
pen of the SS but also by the Wehnnacht troops. She also shows how the in-
vasion of Poland was conceived as a war of annihilation. It is quite true that 
Hitlerhad given the soldiers instructions to "be merciless, be brutal", but it 
is no less true that an analysis of the war diaries of ordinary soldiers reveals 
that the usual way of referring to the Poles was "primitive people", "subhu-
mans". Perhaps that is why 15% of the Polish children were deported to 
work as slave labour in Getmany; perhaps that is why 2% of the French 
population died in the war whereas the percentage rose to 20% in Poland. 
Other revealing cases are the behaviour of the Japanese army in China from 
1937 onwards or the wholesale retaliation carried out by troops of the Red 
Army on Gennan soil, where women were considered to be the spoils of 
war and mass rapes and plundering were general practice. In all these cases 
those who committed the cruelties did not show repentance, the authorities 
themselves encouraged them, and sorne poets exalted them in terms of 
courage anda sense of justice. 
Probably the Soviet soldier who had experienced the barbarity of the 
Germaus in his fields and cities, who had seen his family and friends killed 
or tortured, and who was hardened by hunger, fatigue and fear, spurred on 
by the instinct to survive and comforted by the brotherhood of war, saw no 
objection to his behaviour in the final struggle against fascism. To us it 
seems appalling. Probably the soldier who advanced in the Orbe Novo -
justified by the Requerimiento, which in tum was legitimised by the Borgia 
Pope's bull - saw no moral problem in setting dogs on American Indian 
20. See J. _ouêkÉú=The second world war. A people's history, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 200 l. 
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populations and tearing them apart, considering them to be barbarians ancl 
pagans and therefore subhuman. But there is no need to be an evolutionisf> 
orto share Hegel's philosophy of history for sorne historical developments<\ 
to appear to us to be gains that should not be reversible if we do not wish tó } 
make our whole world burst into smithereens. Examples of this are a cef// 
tain universalism in which all huinan beings count, ar in which we shoulCÍ/ 
strive to make them count, so that they are subjects in their own right; no( 
tolerating physical -injury, suffering and violent death; feeling moved -by) 
these things and attempting forms of reparation and aid (which, of coursé, / 
are conceived in many different ways); or, as we have been talking of) 
popes, defending a lay conception of the State which conceives religiou$\. 
beliefs to be a private matter21 • _ _ _____ -- __ ._-----•·.•._-• 
One <loes not need to adopt a strictly comparatist perspective to affinn. 
thatthe process of interpretation inevitably entails comparison. It is true, as ( 
I recalled when l quoted aÉíáÉnnÉú=that anthropology has had a greater V()h:>. 
cation for comparison, whereas history - with the exception of certain re:-• 
cent, and increasingly abundant, developments - has been inclined to studyf'.i 
its objects ·"in themselves". But the canonically ethnographic works alsc)i\ 
study this and tbat - a rite-of passage, a magical-practice - in an isolated< 
way, "in themselves". Jürgen Kocka, a defender of comparative analysisin\i 
so-called "critica! social history", repeatedly affirms, when reviewing rey . 
cent historiography in German and English, that "history, as a specialiSed/ 
discipline, has not shown any special inclination far compar¡son far a long ) 
time"22• Incidentally, Detienne, in bis critical denunciation of the lack ()f\ 
comparatism among historians, does not exactly say that this methodologif{i 
cal behaviour is entirely absent, but rather that the usual thing is to éêacúású·á?=
it within nearby national ar state frameworks in the European context, thtis 
avoiding comparisons between contexts that are distant in space ar time< 
and, therefore, cooperation with anthropological studies. However, Kocka)/ 
observations, more moderate on this point, seem opportune:· tbe frequenc)'i\ 
of comparison between European nation-states is largely due to the fact that,> 
the empirical sources and material of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries•H 
are to be found in specifically national forms (statistics, archives of profes.-) 
sional associations, legislation, or oral documents such as memories of wai< 
experiences, etc.). But if ·ane is dealing with matters where there is a clearii 
overlap between history and anthropology, su ch as the case of how socáÉíáúsy=
have managed the memory óf their defeats or of their guilt (the example is< 
bis), then Kocka does not hesitate to advise comparison between ÉéochúáL=
within greater spaces, such as Graeco-Roman Antiquity or the Europeari\ 
Middle Ages. <Y 
· .. ·.,::·. 
21. Once again I agree with Taylor, although not with the whole of his position. · · i.ii 
22. J. Kocka, "La comparación histórica", in Historia social y conciencia hist6rica.> 
Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2002, pp. 58-59. , · - - -_ · >< 
··.·::· 
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1 must insist, however, that the type of comparison that 1 am defending 
is not th.is one, which is inevitably involved in the interpretation of the éasíú=
but the comparison which is derived from the fact that, ab initio, 1 cannot 
help setting out from the conceptual and va1orative suppositions of my lan-
guage of reference when 1 set about the interpretation. Even if only as a 
symptomt 1 think that this aspect is shown when Kocka seeks to qualify 
comparative history in the "proper sense". It is charucterised by systematic 
comparison of the similarities and differences between two or more histori-
cal phenomena not only in arder to describe them and expla:in them con-
vinc:ingly but also. and at the same time, with the aim of "formulating far-
reaching statements about historical actions, experiences, processes and 
structures". And now let's turn to the symptom: that proper sense, he says, 
must be distinguished "from those studies in which the comparisons appear 
only in passing, marginally or implicitly ... through comparisons insinuated 
between the before and the after. Such proto-comparisons are ofteii 
found"23 . 1 believe that these "proto-comparisons", to use Kocka's term, are 
inescapable owing to our "home language", given the impossibility of "the 
view from nowhere", cosmic exile or the perspective from the eye of God 
(take your pick from Nagel, Quine or Putnam). 
A relatively different matter is the strict comparative behaviour in which 
one seeks to establish similarities and disparities between two or more units 
of analysis, either with a v:iew to achieving a better understanding, through 
contrast, of what makes them peculiar, or else with the aím of highlighting 
coincidences ond arriving at generalisations. When Kocka reviews the uses 
and risks of comparison, he repeatedly warns about the "decisionist ele-
ments" which the practice of comparison entails. The decisions that have to 
be tak:en are various, although they refer especially to the question that is 
formulated (for the sake of which the comparisons are established and di-
rected) and to the requirements enta:iled by the various k.inds of arguinents 
in which a comparison is :involved, taking the various contexts and . aims 
into account. Dealing with German National Socialism in terms of the con-
cepts of "fascism" or "totalitarianisin" pennits one set of comparisons or 
another: "both comparisons are legitimate. Which of them is undertaken de-
pends on what one is interested in knowíng?ú=the decision between syn-
chronic and diachronic comparisons "can also not be taken a priori, but 
rather ít depends on what one is interested in knowing". In general, the 
choice of the units of comparison "cannot be made without resorting to de-
cisionist elements, for historical reality often lacks urrivocal delimitations, 
which nevertheless have to be presupposed ... "24• And in the end what we 
are interested in, a value judgement, always appears.. . .. _ 
23. Ibidem, pp. 43 and 44. 
24. Ibidem, pp. SO and 52-53. 
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Tbe fact that historical judgement differs from judicial judgement inas-=--
muchas the latter is closed (in the end a definiüve sentence is éêonouncÉdgúW_ú=
whereas in the case of history the "concentric circles'' of the Éñélanaíáoêá¡ú=
conHnually reopen so that history is rewritten a thousand times) <loes not:: 
nullify the invol vement of value judge1nent in lhe in.te1pretation of hásíoêóKI _úú=
For the reopening of the writing of histo:ry is due not only to new coníêábuúWWL=
tions ()J' reinterpretations of the archive, or the consideration of new causes:) 
ilnd reasons when it comes to explaining or nnderstanding, but also to the> 
vaiions interests and values that are sbown in the renewed representations) 
of the past in literature. Certain documents and -r1ot others, one model or anúáúW=
other, one scale or another, one organisation of the plot or another, sbowing>: 
or telling ... On all these levels of historical practice the centrality of selec:- .\ 
tion is shown: and we select one thing or ai1other because we judge it to be:'.:: 
preferable in terms of interest, because we value it in a certain way, in oêdÉêJWú=
that the past may illuminate our present and the future be in accordance< 
with our renewed aspirations25 , · 
*** 
To co11clude 1 shall toúch on a more or less implicit supposition made by . 
the supporters of incomparability and valorative epoché. ·Tuose who defen(f 
the j udgment immanent in the hístorica] object studied think of epochs, cul- ·ú=
tures, societies and so on with a uniformity and homogeneity that are clÉaíWXXúK= · 
ly false. The further away they are from llS in time or space, the more hoDú=. 
mogeneous they are considered to be. This is dueto a mistaken undÉêsíandú _lW=
ing of a cm:rect affinnation: tbat mearung is constructed socially26• However/ 
statíng that meaning is constructed sociaHy is not the same as imagining ·. 
humanity as if it were a set of semantic m'.onads without windows. As a êÉú=. 
sult they think tbat individuals are totally dete.rmined in their action, wáíhúD=••· 
out any margin for dissent or deviant behaviour, as if in a particular period ·. 
there were only one possible moral judgement tltat belonged to it. In his laêKW úK=
est book Clifford Geertz criticises this integral contigurational notion of _ 
cultural identity which conc'eives it from the fundamental perspective of 
consensos. A conception which thinks of different cultures as being seam:.-· 
less units, absolutely integrated totalities, - witb precise, enduring limits, 
seen frmn the aspect of a pointil1ist landscape which eventually makes uéaú=
motlled wor1d of different cultures, in which cach is a compact, homoge-
neous, simple, uniform unit. 
In that ámagÉú=or mode of representation, anthropology and its reception 
have. a considerable part of the responsibility. Another part con-esponds to , 
the phi.losophies of history, such as Herder's. hl tbe case of aníhêoéologóú=
this pointillist conception of cultures comes from the kind of fieWwork thaf. 
25. Ricoeur, op. cit., pp. 421 and 442 ff. 
26. See C. Geertz, op. cit., p. 78. 
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anthropologists canied out in political situations very different from the 
present ones. The fact that after the First World War the increase in pro-
longed, participative fieldwork - the famous participating observation -
took place on islands in the Pacific (Malinowski and his Argonauts) or in 
small African communities (Evans-Pritchard and the Nuer or the Azande) 
transformed the generic conception of culture characte1istic of evolutionism 
into a configurational conception of it. Culture was what nations had in 
common, each with its own particular culture. But after the Second World 
War not only the political processes of decolonisation and of fonnation of 
new states but also the actual decrease in those nations - peoples of the jun-
gle or the Arctic, of the ocean or the desert - led anthropologists to look to-
wards more complex milieus (there was a time when British anthropology 
took the Mediterranean Basin as a theme for research, and now there are 
well-established anthropological research programmes about Europe, and 
even about the highly "exotic'' process of decision-taking in the European 
administration in Brussels). 
All this causéd- the configurational conception to become imprecise and 
therefore unmanageable. It must be understood that what happened was not 
that the gradual disappearance of encapsulated nations of this kind caused a 
particular kind of culture to disappear, but that the fact that anthropology 
was looldng at other kinds of community led to a change in the very con-
ception of what cultures were like, of the criteria for individuating them and 
of cultural identity. In fact, when societies of this kind which have become 
residual are considered now, they are no longer observed with the same 
concept of culture as was applied befare. Because, both befare and now, the 
situation has always been that nations are not isolated and do not lack inter-
na! diversity. So that culture, of one kind or anotlier, can no longer be 
viewed as was done by the configurational conception: as a consensus 
about what was fundamental, about the true, the good and the beautiful; or, 
if you prefer, as a consensus about conceptions, feelings and values. 
If those in favour of incomparability and abstention from judgement 
were to take their particularism to its final consequences, if they paid atten-
tion to the diversity which they apparently defend, they would see that it is 
much greater, because groups, subgroups and exceptional or anomalous in-
dividuals-make upa tangled mesh of cultural differences. A mesh of broken 
lines, constantly shifting, in a constant state of metamorphosis. Not all sod-
eties have the same degree of cornplexity and dynamisms, but they are all 
complex and dynanúc. lt is not true that in the time of Aristotle the defence 
of natural slavery and the related notion of barbarity were inevitable. A..ris-
totle himself says, in his Politics, when he is beginning to expound his the-
ory: "but others think that herile [master and slave] govemment is contrary 
to nature, and that it is the law which makes one man a slave and another 
free, but that in nature there is no difference; for which reason that power 
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cannot be founded in justice, but in force''27• And, certainly, the poet mhálúú{D·D=
mon and the philosopher Met:rodorns, among others, were opposed to slav-i'. Iú=
ery. Even earlier the sophist Antiphon had said: "We respect and venerate- W·K{ú=
'the children of good parents', but we do not respect or venerate those whlIDKKFXúíy=
do not come from a good home. In this respect we behave in t:he same waWvh!úà¡¡ú=
as barbadans, since by nature we are all, barbm·ians and Greeks, madúeáWNúúú=
equal by nature in all things. One has only to observe the natural needs of Lú=
all men. All men seek to satisfy those needs, and in this there is no distinc- · ú=
tion in any one of us, whether he is a barbarían ora Greek,,28• Note that the gáXú=
fust part of the quotation refers to the absence of moral virtue, and it is wáíhàffyyú=
reference to the moral sphere that the equality of barbarians and Hellenes áDsKN·áLláú=
" ' yWKWKDKWKXGFú=
established. ·WWLX¡Wú=
. ú=ú= . . . - . . KKú=
Along the same lines, in the times of the discovery and tbe conquest '3' 
ú=
there was discussion about the scope of the papal bull, whether the domin-: . W?Xú=
ion granted to lsabe] and Fernando was temporal or spiritual, aod so. on .. ; .. WFKúú=
The fact that there was a diversity of voices is shown by the controversy bÉL?YXú=
tween Sepúlveda and Las Casas. However, there were different voices not ?úz=
only "here" but also ?íhÉêÉ?ú=To confirm this one has only to consult León- ' ·Kú=
Porti1la's The Broken Spears, or Todorov's_ The Conquest of America: The ,,; 
Question of the Other. A diversity that affected the American Indians them-..... WKúEyKá=
- 1 ' ' • ' \. r· r:::·:: 
sel ves, sínce even lhe Aztecs or. Mexica were in turn valued and judged OQ. :<!% 
the basis of their customs by the nations subjected to them, or in constant ú·EWDXDK=
frontier wars' to capture future sacrificial victims, and so on. Jonathan · 
Glover takes C.R. _êownángús=account of the behaviout of the ''ordinary 
men" of Reserve Pobce Battalion 101 in the killlngs o_f Polish Jews as aba·- .1 
sis for asserting that tl1eir increasü1g brutalisatioa was not the cause of thefr · ,:\\: 
condud but, on the contrary, the effect of their participation in the killings.· ,1!: 
Joanna Bourke, however, on the basis of the same report, tells the case of 
August Zorn, who could not bear to· go on taking part in .the executión of · 
women', children and old people in the town of Zozoefow29• There is always . :._;. 
the possibility of a moral exception. So, when i.t comes to ihterpreting the .,··/J 
actions of an agent, there are various possible contemporary assessment.s of 
the reasons that inspire or justify them, and there is no doubt that among 
them there may be some that are c1oser than others to the axio1ogical wealth 
of the historian 01· the anthropologist. No longer as a member of a cultural . 
community, which ilself is plural, but as an inc.liviclual who, .¡n the exercise 
of his liberty, goes beyond the legacy of the tradition to which he belongs,· 
. - . . . 
• • .. ú=. . . . . i : : .. ¡ . 
27. Aristotle, Politics, 1253b. , . , : ;.. .. . ', . '· . ... . ·, :: 
28. Sofistas. Testimonios y fragmentos. Translated by Antoni Piqué Angordans .. 
Bruguera, Barcelona, 1985, pp. 223-224. . · 
29. See J. Glover, Humanidad e lnh'umanidad. Una historia ·moral del sislo XX. Cátedra, 
Madrid, 2001, and J. Bourke, op. cit., Both refer to C.R. Browning, Ordina1y Me11: Reserve 
Po/ice Hatttdio11 101 ami the Final So/utio11 i11 Poland. Harper Perenníal, Ncw York. 1993. · 
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a.Ithough necessarily. not in ún=absoluíú=way because of the logic-al ·coêádáàú?JWJ?=··-
llons of doubt, as W1ttgenstem showed m On Certainty. > ._.:. ,..: ' _ · · 
In the case of antlrropology, Lévi-Strauss was emphatic on this point, 
precisely in the double context of bis clarification about what should be un-
derstood by racisn1 - avoiding imprecise definitions motivated by· good in-: 
tcntions - and of the defence of cultural pluralism. Citing the testimony of: 
Lowie, who had studied the Crow an<l Hopi lndians, getting on perfectly · 
with tbe former and barely being endure<l by the latter, the French anthrow· .. 
pologist statcd that - helonging, as he did, to a culture with a "different sys-
lem of values" and lifestyle - there were "very different" culntres which did 
not appeal to him: "If I stu<ly them as an ethnologist, 1 do so with all lhe ob-
jectivity and even with all the empathy of which I am capable. This does 
not prevent tertain cultures from agreeing worse than others with my 
own''3º. 1 do not know if it would be politically correct now to reproduce 
the severe judgements which Lévi-Strauss considered that Islam deserved 
in the mid-fifties, or at least the Islam lhat extends at the foot of the moun-
tains of Kashmir - from Rawalpindi to Peshawar - for, although his criti-
cism is general, the expe1ience described is local. Quite the opposite of his 
sympatby for Huddhism: "Now 1 se.e India as being above fslamú=bul the In-
dia of the Buddha, before Mahomet, who,for me, a European, and because 
/ ama European, rises up between our refiec tion and the doctrines closest 
to it as the awkward spoilsport who separates the hands of East and West, 
intenupting a round that destined them to come togetherº. However, when 
he sunm1ed up the reasons for bis malaise in relation to Islam, he said: "In 
it 1 rediscover the world from which 1 come: Islam is the West of the 
East"31 .- It is this apparent paradox that he takes as his theme at the end of 
Tristes Tropiques, in the last part of the book, which significanlly bears the 
headi ng "Thc Return". 
There, just before his severe analysis of Islam, he devotes himself to in-
specting a dilcmma which transcends that case. Either the ethnographer ad-
heres to the nonns of bis society, and íhÉêÉfoêú=others inspire in him only a 
rrúxture of curiosity and reprobation, or eJse he surrcnders totally to alíen 
societies and his objectivity is impaired because, al any rate, he has re-
nounced one of them (bis own). This dilemma appears in various fonns. If 
we judge .other social groups in relation to aims comparable to our own, 
then we shall judge that on sorne occasions sorne groups are supe1ior to us, 
·. , ...... 
. . 
. ú= ú= --
30. C. Lévi-Strauss, De cerca y de lejos, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1990, p. 207. 
· 3 l. See Tristes Trópicos. Paidós, Barcelona,.J 992, pp. 462 and 459, respectivcly. The 
cmpbasis in thc fü'st quotation is mine. It is not possible here to reproduce bis comparative 
analysis of ls1nm and Buddhism. Compare the chapters "TaxiJa" un<l "The Kyong'» lhe very 
last two chapters in the book. They even deserve a rhetorical analysis, which would show 
what is also stated expUcitly with R harshness free from any compromise or blurring: his 
nversion for Islam and his sympathy for Buddhism. 
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whereas on other occasions they are inferior; there is no doubt, howÉvÉNú=
that in this way we reserve a privileged position for our no1ms and customs. 
On the other hand, if we accept tbat in the range of options open to soci-
eties each one has made a choice, and these choices are incomparable and 
have the same value, then we yield to "an eclecticism that forbids us to êÉú= ·:! 
pudiate anything in any culture: even the cruelty, injustice and poverty ·: 
againsl which that sarne society which suffers them sometimes protests. 
Andas those abuses also exist among us, what right will we have to combat · 
them de:finitively if aJI that is required to make us bow before them is for · 
them to appear elsewhere?" Lévi-Strauss speaks of the paradox implied by ·,'1:;; 
an ethnologist who is "critical at home and conformist abroad.,, an ethnolo"":··/¡ 
gist who, "if he acts in lús own núlieu, deprives himself of the possibility of ;· 
understanding others; but if he wishes to understand everythilig, he will re-
nounce changing anything"32• The solution that he adopted ü1 response to 
this dilemma is well known: the ethnologic study should seek tbe invariants 
in any society in order to constrnct a model "whích no society reproduces 
faithfully", which "does not correspond to any observable reality,,, but 
which must guide all social investigation. However, if we ask ourselves in 
what di.rection, thcn the assumptions about it appears jn Lévi-Stra.uss re-
splendently, without any restriction: it is Rousseau - "the most cthnograph-
ic of philosophers . . . Rousseau otu- master, Rousseau, our brother . . . to 
whom evety page of this book could have been dedicated ... ,, - who should 
guide us to find the kind of natural man immanent in the social state, to un-
ravel the principies of social 1ife "which we sha11 apply to thc refonn of our 
own customs and not. the refonn of other societies"33• 
When Kocka revíews the methodological fünctions of comparative be.:· 
haviour in the strict sense, he says that from a paradigmatic viewpoint com-
parison shows the "cultural specificity and historicity" of the concepts that 
the historian handles. So that it "gjves rise to reftcction about Janguage, and 
therefore about the cultural position of the researcher who compares"34• 
That is quite true, and nothing has yet been said about the logic of the mu.;: 
tation of the valuations therríselves, which can occur in the process of inter-
pretation of what is alien, or of the elasticity of those changes and their lim-
its. It can be said, quite rightly, thal if what is desirable is only home tluths, 
the.n what is the point of all the hard work of considering what is ali.en . . 
What 1 am aiming al, of course, is nota self-satistied repetition of that atti-
tude. My purpose is to defend the view that the logic of interpretation nec-
essarily entails comparison and judgement values. fnitially it can only be 
done by setting out from the values . and system of preferenccs implicit in 
: . ·. ú·=
· . .': .. ',• 
32. Ibídem, pp. 439-440. ·-, I' :.'f 
33. /bidem, p. 446. 
34. Kocka, op. cit., pp. 48-49. 
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the interpreter's language of reference. But that is not the same as agreeing 
that judgement should always conclude in rejection, in a negative judge-
ment, of what is alien. In any case, in the elucidation of the way of review-
ing one's own beliefs, one must distinguish various situations: those in 
which the others are copresent, and thereforé possible ínterlocutors, and 
those in which the othemess refers to people of the past, so that imagining 
a conversation with them is only a metaphor. At thís point anthropology 
and history diverge, and the former, if its study is about peoples that coexist 
with the researcher, tends to transmute into political philosophy, even if 
only in the form of the debate about multiculturalism or about the range and 
limits of tolerance. It is not possible now to go into the complexity that thís 
discussion has acquired in recent decades. 
However, Ricoeur's historico-typological reconstruction of the virtue of 
tolerance, precisely in relation to cultural traditions, seems to be appropri-
ate and opportune35• Ricoeur understands the historical vicissitudes of this 
virtue as a double process of delegitimisation of the right to prevent and of 
disarming of the power to prevent. Initially, ata time corresponding to the 
Peace of Westphalia and the Edict of Nantes, the form of tolerance might 
have been condensed into the assertion "I reluctantly endure something of 
which 1 disapprove because 1 have no power to prevent it". A second stage, 
representing a point of unstable equilibrium between criticism and convic-
tion, corresponds to the ecumenicism of Erasmus or Leibniz, with a formu-
la that might be summed up as: "I disapprove of your way of life but 1 st.rive 
to understand it, even though 1 cannot go along with if'. The third step does 
not involve shared truth but recognition of the right to error: "I disapprove 
of your way of life but I respect your freedom to live in your own way be-
cause I recognise the right to manifest that freedom publicly". This is the 
moment of enlightenment from which we derive the rights of opinion, ex-
pression, association, publication, manifestation and so on - positive free-
dom, the equal right to take part actively in the constitution of political 
power. In the following formulation there is a presumption of truth in the 
other: "I neither approve nor disapprove of the reasons far which you live 
in a different way from me, since it may be that those reasons express a re-
lationship with goodness and truth which escapes me owing to the finite-
ness of human understanding". But justice and truth now come together, 
with the risk of an implosion of truth, so that tolerance may turn into indif-
ference. The fifth link in the chain, "1 accept all ways of conducting one's 
own life on condition that no injury is done to others, on condition that 
third. parties are not manifestly harmed", involves a minimalist poli tics and 
35. See P. Ricoeur P., "Le dialogue des Cultures. La confrontation des hérita.ges cul-
turels", in Aux sources de la culture Franfaise, Editions La Découverte, Paris, 1997, pp. 97-
105. 
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morality: avoiding harm. The problem, however, is the various interpreta7 :·: 
tions and reinterpretations of benefit and harm, a problem that can only bÉWúW·W=
cause for conflict. · · 
Ricoeur defends ''cofoundationn: rethinking all the components of our': 
complex European cultural heritage jn accordance with the unfulfilled:· 
prorrrise:s of the past, and remembering what has been forgotten, what did 
not con1e to maturity. On this point he seems to be in agreement with one of · 
Wíttgenstein's s0111ewhat cryptic annotations: "The insidious thing about.:. 
the causal point of view is that it leads us to say: 'of course, it had to hap7'. ,, 
pen like that.' 'Whereas we ought to tbink: it may have happened like íhaêúY=
and also in many other ways"36• Wifh regard to the way o-f reviewing oútC 
beliefs, Ricoeur argues for a consensual-conflictive notion of tolerance, 'a/ 
conception that seeks partial consensus and accepts reasonable disagree- .' 
ments. Insofar as there are irreducible aspects in differences in conviction, 
not all the conflicts can be eliininated. Therefore one must distinguish be-< 
tween those with which it is or is not possible to argue, which shows that. 
Ricoeur is thinking of a situation in wbich conversation can take place (and.: 
therefore can also be blocked). Consequently, even though he insists on the::. 
great historical conquest implied by tt1e model of tólerance, from the outset'< 
of his refiection he states that what moves him is "the search for a moêÉWú=
positive foundation, going beyond what remains of abstention in the conKXKDú=
cept of tolerance"37• 
To conclude: my main aim has been to criticise the point of view which · 
tends to obviate any judgement of the past because, once again in the words·, 
of Renan, "if looked at too closely, the King of France loses his prestige"38/ ' 
For, taking the exarnple of the comme1norative use of the Borgia Pope wifü,< 
a view to "const1ucting", "imagining'' or "recapturing" a cultural traditiori 
which might help to delimita Valencian identity, his apologists do compare' 
and implicitly jud.ge - positively - in acco1:dance with certain aspects: it 
seem.s praiseworthy to them that the Borgia famlly is "one of the more álú=
lustrious and powe.rful Valencian families in history"; in the sarne way tbat; · 
in indicating the groundlessness of the "black legend" and insisting on their;. 
patronage and on their courtly Renaissance refinement, they do so on thd\ 
basis of the value tbat the fine arts have for them, or the fa.et that this fami! . 
ly retained Catalan in Rome as the Janguage for ordinru-y relations long af.:.'··. 
ter abandoning the thén Kingdom of Valencia. In this case, too, howÉvÉêú=·: 
the fact is that, if looked at "too elosely", the Pope loses his pres ti ge. 
That ít is not so f or so me of us depends not on the in1possibility or ille-· 
gitimacy of con1paring and judging but on the effects of distance, whether· 
36. Wittgenstein, Culture a11d Value, B1ackwell, Oxford, 1992, p. 37e. ·· 
37. P. Ricoeur, "Le dialogue des Cultures. La confrontation des héritnges culturels", op.'.. 
cit., p. 97. The emphasis is mine. ·ú·=
38. Renan, op. cit., p. 35. '· 
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physical or temporal, on the moral imagination. From a distance there 
seems to be a cultural and morál homogeneity which, de facto, never exists 
in societies; likewise, frotn a distance it appears that people's suffering and 
the perverse decisions that affect them become blurred and diluted in an in-
distinct continuum whích we tend to call cultural legacy or tradition. Al-
though quite prepared to condemn the totalitarian barbarity of the twentieth 
century, they nevertheless think it impertinent to bring up the legitimisation 
of the conquest of America. But the fact that they do not want to look "too 
closely" also depends on a way of thinking that puts the obsession with cul-
tural identity in the centre of every picture, The fact that they think that in-
dividuals are, or should be, formed by a culture to which they belong de-
pends on moral, historical and political options. The wretchedness which 
that culture may include is not important; what matters is, as Renan pointed 
out, that the individuals in it should have a great <leal in comtnon and that 
they should all have forgotten many things. 
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